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Abstract – ‘Safe harbour’ is shorthand for a bundle of privileges in insolvency which are typically 
afforded to financial institutions. They are remotely comparable to security interests as they provide a 
financial institution with a considerably better position as compared to other creditors should one of its 
counterparties fail or become insolvent. Safe harbours have been and continue to be introduced widely 
in financial markets. The common rationale for such safe harbours is that the protection they offer 
against the fallout of the counterparty’s insolvency contributes to systemic stability, as the dreaded 
‘domino effect’ of insolvencies is not triggered from the outset. However, safe harbours also come in 
for criticism, being accused of accelerating contagion in the financial market in times of crisis and 
making the market more risky. This paper submits that the more important argument for the existence 
of safe harbours is liquidity in the financial market. Safe harbour rules do away with a number of legal 
concepts, notably those attached to traditional security, and thereby allow for the exponentiation of 
liquidity. Normative decisions of the legislator sanction safe harbours as modern markets could not 
exist without these high levels of liquidity. To the extent that safe harbours accelerate contagion in 
terms of crisis, which in principle is a valid argument, specific regulation is well suited to correct this 
situation, whereas to repeal or significantly restrict the safe harbours would be counterproductive. 
 
Keywords: Insolvency, financial institutions, collateral, close-out netting, liquidity, systemic risk 
* Assistant Professor, Department of Law, London School of Economics and Political Science (E-mail: p.paech@lse.ac.uk). I 
would like to thank Christos Hadjiemmanuil, Sarah Paterson, Julia Told and the two anonymous reviewers of the Oxford Journal 





In the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008, the financial industry was proud 
that its standard contracts, the so-called ‘master agreements’, documenting derivative, 
repo and other types of financial transactions1 worth trillions of US dollars in value,2 
had withstood the storm.3 This was taken as substantiating the value of the risk 
mitigation mechanisms included in these agreements, probably their most important 
function.4 Their significance is readily illustrated by a comparison with the real estate 
market. Just as the real estate market in its present form would not exist without 
concepts such as mortgage or hypothec, the modern financial market would not exist 
without master agreements and their built-in risk mitigation mechanisms, notably 
                                                 
1 This article, for ease of reference, generally refers to derivative and sale-and-repurchase (‘repo’) transactions. In a 
derivative contract, the obligations of the parties depend on a reference value which typically changes over time, eg the market 
price of a basket of shares. Derivatives are generally (but not necessarily) documented under the 2002 Master Agreement (or its 
earlier versions) promoted by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA – not publicly available). Repos are 
functionally akin to a secured loan but different from the legal perspective: an asset is sold against a cash payment and bought 
back at a later point in time at a slightly different price. Repos are often documented under the Global Master Repurchase 
Agreement (GMRA)  <http://www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/Legal/GMRA-2011/GMRA-
2011/GMRA%202011_2011.04.20_formular.pdf> accessed 10 March 2015. However, safe harbours generally also cover other 
types of contract, such as securities lending, dealings in foreign exchange, financial instruments, precious metals, etc, see 
UNIDROIT, Principles on the Operation of Close-out Netting Provisions (2013 – ‘Unidroit Principles on Close-out Netting’), 
Principle 4 and accompanying commentary <http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/capital-markets/netting> accessed 10 March 
2015. There are many different national, regional and international master agreements, see for further examples P Paech, ‘The 
Need for an International Instrument on the Enforceability of Close-out Netting in General and in the Context of Bank 
Resolution’ (2011) UNIDROIT Study S78c Doc. 2, 11 http://www.unidroit.org/english/documents/2011/study78c/s-78c-02-
e.pdf> accessed 10 March 2015. 
2 To provide a fragmentary and regionally limited picture: at the end of June 2014 the outstanding gross market value of 
over-the-counter derivatives was about 17.5tn USD world wide, see Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Derivatives 
Statistics, Table 19 <http://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm> accessed 10 March 2015. On 8 October 2014, the value of total 
outstanding repo transactions in the USA was 3.88tn USD, see A Copeland and others, ‘Lifting the Veil on the U.S. Bilateral 
Repo Market’ <http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2014/07/lifting-the-veil-on-the-us-bilateral-repo-
market.html#.VP3J6ELd7wx> last accessed on 10 March 2015. At the European end of the repo market, the total value of the 
repo contracts outstanding on the books of the 65 institutions that participated in the relevant survey was EUR 5.7tn EUR in June 
2014, see International Capital Markets Association, ‘European Repo Market Survey No 27’ 
<http://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/short-term-markets/Repo-Markets/repo/latest/> last 
accessed 10 March 2015. 
3 See D Mengle, ‘The Importance of Close-out Netting’ (2010) ISDA Research Notes No. 1 
<http://www.isda.org/researchnotes/pdf/Netting-ISDAResearchNotes-1-2010.pdf> accessed 10 March 2015; in relation to the 
fall-out from the (pre-crisis) Enron scandal see ISDA, ‘Enron: Corporate Failure, Market Success’ paper delivered at the 17th 
Annual General Meeting, Berlin, 17 April 2002, 10-15 <http://www.isda.org/whatsnew/pdf/EnronFinal4121.pdf> accessed 10 
March 2015. 
4 Master agreements provide the general advantages of widely used standard contracts, such as common terminology, 
compatibility, etc. The ISDA Master Agreement, for instance, further adds provisions on taxation and on multi-branch scenarios. 
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termination, close-out netting and collateral.
5
 That is to say, what is discussed in this 
article refers to a cornerstone of our modern economies.   
In the event of a financial institution’s6 insolvency or similar event, a master 
agreement limits the credit risk7 of its financial counterparties.8 Master agreements enable 
financial counterparties to liquidate entire portfolios of open contracts as soon as the other 
part fails or otherwise becomes a greater risk.9 Prompt liquidation of all derivatives and 
repo positions leaves the counterparties with a relatively modest amount to pay to or, 
respectively, claim from the failing institution. Accordingly, their potential loss remains 
comparably small and their contracts do not run the risk of becoming entangled in lengthy 
insolvency proceedings that might be opened over the failing firm.  
The laws of most developed financial markets10 make sure that these — purely 
contractual — arrangements are enforceable despite the fact that the liquidation 
arrangements made under master agreements somehow contravene the pari passu 
principle,11 much as in the case of security interests. The insolvency law provisions that 
guarantee the enforceability of master agreements in the event of insolvency are generally 
                                                 
5 See n 32 and n 35 and accompanying text. 
6 ‘Financial institutions’ is used here in the colloquial sense and includes banks, investment firms and many other types of 
business intervening in the financial markets. The exact scope of eligible financial institutions differs between jurisdictions, see P 
Paech, ‘Close-out Netting, Insolvency Law and Conflict-of-laws’ (2013) 14-2 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 419, 443-444. 
7 Counterparty credit risk refers to the potential loss suffered by a party if its counterparty fails, in particular in case of 
insolvency. It basically corresponds to the replacement value of an unperformed contract (A fails and B, while neither has to 
perform, loses the value that their contract had for it). The risk only exists in relation to transactions that have a positive value for 
the solvent party. Counterparty credit risk is different from settlement risk (A fails before performing on the contract, while B has 
already performed). 
8 ‘Financial counterparty’ is often used to refer to an insolvent’s counterparty which is a financial institution.  
9 Typically, ‘events of default’ refer to events where one party fails to comply with its obligations,  such as non-
performance, breach of contractual warranties or representations, etc. ‘Termination events’ refer to instances where no-one is at 
fault but the circumstances change, such as the merger of a party, taxation, etc. Both allow for immediate termination and 
liquidation of the contracts covered by the master agreement. 
10 ISDA lists 43 jurisdictions in which the relevant provisions of master agreements are regarded as generally enforceable 
<http://www.isda.org/docproj/stat_of_net_leg.html#f1> accessed 10 March 2015. 
11 For ease of reference, this article adopts a broad understanding of pari passu as the principle of equal treatment of 
general creditors which informs three questions, notably which assets are available for distribution, who participates in the 
distribution and how the assets should be shared amongst the general creditors (notably pro rata). However, these three issues 
differ conceptually, see, for example, M Bridge and J Braithwaite, ‘Private Law and Financial Crisis’, (2013) 13 Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies 361, 367-370. 
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referred to in the context of US bankruptcy law as the ‘safe harbour’ rules.12 In this 
article, I will use this catchy label also in relation to other jurisdictions, albeit with the 
caveat that safe harbours and their context differ from one jurisdiction to another, as will 
be shown below.  
The rationale for the privileged treatment arising under insolvency safe harbours 
appears to be two-fold. The part of the rationale that occupies the less prominent place in 
the policy debate concerns increased market liquidity through an increased volume of 
repo and derivatives transactions. Quite comparably to ‘traditional’ security interests,13 
safe harbours encourage financial institutions to enter into these contracts by considerably 
reducing the degree of counterparty risk to which they are exposed. The second, more 
prominently voiced rationale refers to contagion in the market should one of these 
systemically important institutions fail.14 This situation, where a financial market 
participant fails because of the earlier failure of its own counterparty is often described as 
‘a domino of insolvencies’ or, more generally, systemic risk.15 This second rationale is 
about decreasing overall systemic risk in the financial market. 
However, the value of the special protection afforded by safe harbours may be 
questioned.16 Particularly in the wake of the latest financial crisis, safe harbours may be 
                                                 
12 For an overview of the incremental development of US safe harbour rules see C Mooney, ‘The Bankruptcy Code’s Safe 
Harbors for Settlement Payments and Securities Contracts: When is Safe too Safe?’ (2014) 49 Texas International Law Journal 
245, 247-251. 
13 In the following I refer to ‘traditional security interests’, meaning arrangements such as, in particular, pledge, mortgage, 
hypothec and charge. This is to facilitate the distinction with the most popular form of securing an obligation in the financial 
market, so called title-transfer collateral, which is an agreement where the obligor transfers full (legal and beneficial) title over an 
asset which is to be re-transferred once the debt has been discharged. The difference between mortgage and title-transfer 
collateral consists in the fact that in case of a mortgage, the mortgagor retains equity of redemption of the asset whereas under a 
title-transfer collateral arrangement the obligor only has a contractual right to retransfer of title of an asset of the same type, see 
H Beale et al, The Law of Security and Title-based Financing, para 3.14; M Smith, ‘Security’ in DD Prentice (ed), Corporate 
finance law in the UK and EU Oxford University Press 241, 242. 
14 See UNIDROIT Principles on Close-out Netting (n 1), Principle 4 – Key Considerations.  
15 For an explanation of systemic risk, see GG Kaufman and KE Scott, ‘What is systemic risk, and do bank regulators 
retard or contribute to it?’ (2003) VII-3 The Independent Review 371-391.  
16 See FR Edwards and ER Morrison, ‘Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code: Why the Special Treatment?’ (2005) 22 
Yale Journal on Regulation 91-122; RR Bliss, and GG Kaufman, ‘Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Netting, Collateral, and 
Closeout’ (2006) 2 Journal of Financial Stability 55-70; SL Lubben, 'Derivatives and Bankruptcy: the Flawed Case for Special 
Treatment' (2009) 12-1 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 61-78; ‘Repeal the Safe Harbors’ (2010) 18 
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 319-335; The Bankruptcy Case without Safe Harbors’ (2010) 84 American 
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regarded as extending unjustified privileges to financial institutions which produce 
negative externalities overall, not least since their cost is borne by non-financial market 
participants and other stakeholders, including society as a whole. Therefore, curtailing or 
even abolishing safe harbours and leading financial institutions back into the ‘regular’ 
insolvency regime may help to dismantle these distortions and decrease the risks inherent 
in the financial market. 
Discussing these assumptions takes us straight back to the two prongs of the 
rationale of safe harbour rules. Again, as we know from the context of traditional security 
interests, it is debatable to what extent there is overall social and economic value in 
allowing parties to circumvent the pari passu baseline of distribution through private 
bargaining, leading to a shift of the risk away from those with higher bargaining power 
(typically banks) to the broader economy. It is ultimately the legislator who transforms 
the result of that debate into a normative policy decision as to the extent to which 
insolvency privileges are available.17  
My main goal is to remove the biases that have dominated the debate so far. 
Therefore, this article places the safe harbours into a broader context, notably by looking 
at jurisdictions other than the US and by adopting a cross-jurisdictional view, as opposed 
to an idiosyncratic one which is incongruent with the international character of financial 
markets. Furthermore, I believe that insolvency law cannot be considered in isolation but 
                                                                                                                                           
Bankruptcy Law Journal 123-144; E Perotti, ‘Systemic Liquidity Risk and Bankruptcy Exceptions’ (2010) DSF Policy Paper 
Series No 8 <http://dare.uva.nl/document/2/114634> accessed 10 March 2015; JM Peck, R Mokal and T Janger, ‘Financial 
Engineering Meets Chapter 11 Safe Harbors and the Bankruptcy Code’ (2011) 
<http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1402065/1/Peck,%20Mokal%20and%20Janger%20on%20Safe%20Harbors%20and%20the%20Bank
ruptcy%20Code.pdf> accessed 10 March 2015; MJ Roe, ‘The Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis 
Accelerator’ (2011) 63 Stanford Law Review 539-589; D Duffie and D Skeel, ‘A Dialogue on the Costs and Benefits of 
Automatic Stays for Derivatives and Repurchase Agreements’ (2012) University of Pennsylvania Law School Institute for Law 
and Economics, Research Paper No. 12-2 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1982095> accessed 10 March 
2015. DA Skeel and TH Jackson, ‘Transaction Consistency and the New Finance in Bankruptcy’ (2012) 112 Columbia Law 
Review 152-202; SL Schwarcz and O Sharon, ‘The Bankruptcy Law Safe-Harbor for Derivatives: a Path-Dependence Analysis’ 
(2014) 71 Wash & Lee Law Review 1715-1755; ER Morrison, MJ Roe an CS Sontchi, ‘Rolling Back the Safe Harbours’ (2014) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2484565> accessed 10 March 2015.  
17 See V Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2009) 601. 
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must be viewed together with other areas of law, notably financial regulation.18 In 
particular, the new global soft law standards, especially those set by the G20 States and 
the Financial Stability Board (FSB), are currently gaining unprecedented momentum and 
are likely to dominate the debate to a much greater extent than will considerations of 
domestic insolvency law policy.19 Regulation is an area of the law that has far greater 
impact on risk mitigation in the financial market than insolvency law could ever 
achieve.20 This issue ties in with the dispute on the insolvency ‘axioms’21, ie the question 
of what insolvency law can and should achieve, in particular in motivating market 
participants to adopt a certain type of conduct while they are still going concerns.  
In the second section, I will widen the perspective to jurisdictions other than the US 
since the picture there is quite different. However, differences relate not so much to the 
safe harbour regime (which is fairly homogeneous globally speaking) as to the gap 
between the safe harbour, on the one hand, and the generally applicable insolvency 
regime, on the other hand: in the US, that gap is considerably more pronounced than it is 
in other jurisdictions (England, Germany, Italy and Belgium will serve as examples here). 
As a result, the polarity between the treatment of the financial and the non-financial world 
— which generally informs the debate in the context of debtor-friendly US bankruptcy 
law — is the exception rather than the rule. It will become clear that jurisdictions with a 
                                                 
18  The differentiation between financial ‘law’ and financial ‘regulation’ is not very clear and in parts nonsensical.  
However, for the present purpose one might think of ‘law’ as addressing horizontal rights between, in particular, creditors and 
debtors or owners and non-owners, whereas ‘regulation’ addresses the vertical State-to-market relationship, mainly working on 
the basis of orders, prohibitions and sanctions for non-compliance.  
19 Since the recent financial crisis, the G20 States have set a number of broader policy goals aimed at strengthening 
financial regulation, in particular relating to derivatives clearing, bank capital requirements, banks’ compensation practices, and 
bank resolution, see in particular ‘G20 Leaders Statement: The Pittsburg Summit’ < 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0925.html#system>. These are typically picked up by the Financial Stability 
Board and transformed into more detailed standards, see http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/what-we-do/policy-
development/. In most cases, these standards are refined by organisations such as the Bank for International Settlements, the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision or the International Organization of Securities Commissions before they are 
implemented into national law or EU law, respectively. Section 4 of this article refers to a number of these instruments. See 
generally C Brummer, ‘Soft Law and the Global Financial System’ (2011) Cambridge University Press. 
20 See Section 4. 
21 DG Baird, ‘Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms’ (1998) 108 Yale Law Journal 573-599; See V Finch, ‘Security, 
Insolvency and Risk: Who Pays the Price’ (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 633-670. 
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more creditor-friendly approach to insolvency policy are much more inclined to embrace 
the notion of insolvency safe harbours. 
The third section addresses the less prominently discussed, yet probably more 
relevant rationale for safe harbours, that of increased liquidity.22 Much like the rationale 
underlying traditional security interests, which are typically introduced to strengthen 
lending markets,23 safe harbour rules allow for more liquidity in the relevant derivatives 
and repo markets. However, the economic advantages of safe harbours go far beyond the 
known effects of traditional security interests. They create remarkable flexibility across 
different types of asset relevant to the financial market, which are money, claims and 
securities. At the same time, they do away with certain legal categorisations, in particular 
that between title transfer collateral and traditional security. This gives financial 
institutions scope for a type of risk management where all positions may be used for all 
purposes and throughout all jurisdictions that admit safe harbours. Under the safe harbour 
protection, the use of collateral becomes extremely efficient—or, viewed from a different 
perspective, it would be fair to say that safe harbours allow the available collateral cover 
to be stretched ever more thinly. 
The fourth section addresses the reduction of systemic risk as the more prominent 
rationale for providing safe harbours. While the base argument — that reducing 
individual counterparty risks leads to reduced overall systemic risk — looks relatively 
straightforward, there would appear to be two potential antagonists to the effect of safe 
harbours which render a discussion much more complex. The first antagonist is moral 
hazard. It stands to reason that considerably lower counterparty risk is likely to trigger a 
more lenient approach to matters of creditworthiness of counterparties — however, 
whether this will lead to a riskier market overall remains difficult to assess. It is equally 
unclear whether it should be the role of insolvency law at all to control market 
                                                 
22 ‘Liquidity’ is the ability to sell any asset for other assets or cash at will, K Pistor, ‘A Legal Theory of Finance’ (2013) 
41 Journal of Comparative Economics 315, 316. 
23 See Finch, ‘Security, Insolvency and Risk’ (n 21) 637. 
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participants’ conduct while they are going concerns. The second antagonist is the effect 
of mass liquidation in the event of failure of a financial institution. Safe harbours may 
rapidly cause the liquidation of the greater part of the portfolio, thereby triggering 
collateral shortages affecting the entire market. Discussing both antagonists leads us 
straight into the question of the growing role of regulation in limiting systemic risk. To 
begin with, bank resolution regimes are now being introduced all over the globe. These 
are novel administrative measures that fall outside traditional categories of insolvency 
proceedings and are precisely aimed at avoiding the systemic impact of bank failures. 
Furthermore, there are now regulatory measures (some under preparation, others already 
implemented) that focus on specific aspects of avoiding systemic risk. As a consequence, 
the immediate relevance of systemic risk mitigation through safe harbours is considerably 
reduced.  
The final section pulls together the various aspects and attempts to draw an overall 
picture of the value of safe harbours. It concludes that safe harbours in their current form 
are necessary for a functioning derivatives and repo market and for the modern financial 
market as a whole, and that they have highly positive effects on liquidity — it is true that 
the collateral cover in the market can be stretched very thinly on the basis of safe 
harbours but this effect is better controlled by regulation. In that sense, the systemic risk 
rationale for safe harbours is somewhat at odds with reality. Insolvency law should not be 
concerned with attempting to mitigate systemic risk in the market: despite its obvious 
influence on managerial decisions it is too bold a concept and not suitable for controlling 
the behaviour of financial institutions. Measures belonging to the sphere of financial 
regulation, such as those mentioned above, are much more effective in this regard.  
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2. The Significance of the Privilege
24
 
When a market participant fails or becomes insolvent, each and every one of its business 
partners will face three fundamental questions:25 first, am I bound to those of our 
contracts that are still open, or may I terminate and liquidate them? Secondly, do I have 
swift access to the collateral or security provided in my favour (if any) or do I need to 
wait before I can enforce it? Thirdly, are earlier actions of my counterparty which were in 
my favour, such as recent payments or recent delivery of security or collateral, potentially 
subject to avoidance by the insolvency official or court? These questions are particularly 
important for financial institutions, especially in respect of their derivative contracts, 
repurchase agreements or similar transactions with the insolvent party. It is not 
uncommon for two financial institutions to have hundreds or even thousands of open 
financial contracts with one another at any given point in time. Therefore, the answers 
provided by insolvency law to these questions generally affect contracts and collateral of 
an enormous combined value.  
The insolvency laws of most developed financial markets26 generally take a 
favourable approach to the financial industry and their financial contracts: contracts can 
be terminated and the collateral swiftly enforced and, generally, earlier payments or 
delivery of collateral cannot be avoided by the insolvency official. These, in plain 
language, are the effects of safe harbour rules. This approach is remarkably homogeneous 
across developed markets.27  
However, safe harbours are more of an exception to generally applicable insolvency 
law in some jurisdictions than in others, largely because the starting point of the general 
insolvency law rules is different. In other words, the ‘privilege’ may be more or less 
significant. The critique voiced by US authors is partly based on the argument that the 
                                                 
24 I am grateful to Giulia Pecce and Sebastiaan Bierens, both research assistants at the LSE Department of Law, for 
researching the relevant Italian and Belgian law referred to in this section. 
25 See Mooney, ‘The Bankruptcy Code’s Safe Harbors’ (n 12) 249.  
26  See n 10. 
27 See the US and European rules listed in n 33, n 40 and n 51. 
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treatment of the financial industry is diametrically opposed to the treatment afforded to 
other, non-financial market participants.28 However, this polarity is particularly pertinent 
to US law. In other jurisdictions the picture is different simply because the starting point 
of their insolvency law is different. Accordingly, it would be inappropriate to transplant 
the debate from the US to other jurisdictions without first examining these differences.  
One clarification is in order here. Comparing the relevant US and EU laws poses a 
structural difficulty from the outset. In the US, the safe harbour rules are federal law 
contained in the United States Code.29 They form part of the general provisions of 
Title 11 ‘Bankruptcy’, and as a consequence apply in both Chapter 7 ‘Liquidation’ and 
Chapter 11 ‘Reorganisation’. The Code is directly applicable and self-contained. EU law 
contains a relevant set of rules spread over a number of instruments, the most important 
of which is the Financial Collateral Directive.30 EU directives are not directly applicable 
or self-contained and therefore do not afford much insight into legal reality. They require 
implementation into national law, ie their rules are cast into the relevant domestic 
statutes, such as domestic insolvency law, secured transactions law, bank regulation and 
other statutes. As a consequence, we have not a single set of EU safe harbour rules but 28 
of them. Therefore, this article has to look at EU law through the filter of concrete 
jurisdictions. To this end, I have chosen four EU countries with different legal traditions 
(common law, civil law Germanic and Napoleonic type) and different approaches to 
implement the Financial Collateral Directive (integration into insolvency law or stand 
alone statute), notably England, Germany, Belgium and Italy. Further, in this section (and 
throughout this article) I make occasional reference to the UNIDROIT Principles on 
                                                 
28 Lubben, ‘Repeal the Safe Harbors’ (n 16) 322-326; Roe, ‘The Derivatives Markets Payment Priorities’ (n 16) 547-549. 
29 On the gradual expansion of the USC safe harbours see M Krimminger, ‘The Evolution of U.S. Insolvency Law for 
Financial Market Contracts’ (2006) Working Paper <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=916345> accessed 10 
March 2015.  
30 Directive 2002/47/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 June 2002 on financial collateral 
arrangements, OJ L168/43 of 27.6.2002 (‘Financial Collateral Directive’). See on the EU framework P Paech, ‘Close-out 
Netting’ (n 8) 434-439.  
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Close-out Netting31. They are a non-binding best-practice guide and offer a succinct 
overview on the effect of safe harbours.  
 
A. Liquidation of Contracts 
The principal building block of master agreements consists of provisions allowing one 
party to liquidate, en bloc, all executory contracts should a termination or default event 
occur. The term ‘close-out netting’ is generally used instead of ‘liquidation’ in that 
context. Close-out netting involves a number logical steps: first, termination of the 
relevant bundle of contracts; secondly, determination of the value of each contract; 
thirdly, set-off of the positive and negative values so that only a net balance is owing; 
and, fourthly, acceleration of the resulting payment obligation.32 The safe harbour rules of 
the relevant forum typically prescribe that the close-out netting mechanism contained in 
the master agreement remains enforceable beyond the counterparty’s insolvency and 
cannot be stayed or avoided on the basis of their being deemed inconsistent with the 
principle of equal treatment of creditors. 33  
In US law, by contrast, termination of executory contracts upon insolvency 
motivated solely by the financial position of the insolvent (‘ipso-facto clause’) is 
expressly prohibited and the set-off of any debt owing to the debtor is stayed from the 
moment the petition is filed.34 Also, the trustee can cherry-pick, choosing contracts 
favourable to the insolvent estate and rejecting the others, thus disintegrating what was 
                                                 
31 See n 1. 
32 The liquidation mechanisms provided for in the different master agreements do not necessarily work exactly in the 
same way but the functional result remains the same, see UNIDROIT Principles on Close-out Netting (n 1), Principle 2 with 
commentary. 
33 Articles 4(4), 7(4) Financial Collateral Directive; 11 USC §§ 362(b)(6)-(7)-(17)-(27) and (o); 555-556, 559-561; s12(1) 
Financial Collateral Arrangements (No. 2) Regulation (UK); §104 Insolvenzordnung (Germany); Article 14 Loi relative aux 
sûretés financières (Belgium); Article 7 Decreto legislativo n. 170 in material di contratti di garanzia finanziaria (Italy). For a 
generic functional liquidation clause, see UNIDROIT Principles on Close-out Netting (n 1), Principle 7 with commentary. As 
long as parties are solvent, contractual provisions to that effect are unproblematic and can be freely operated as an expression of 
the principle of freedom of contract. However, should a party become insolvent, that principle might be overridden by mandatory 
rules of insolvency law, thus hindering in particular termination and set-off of the bundle of contracts. 
34 11 USC §§ 365(e)(1) and 541(c)(1); § 362(a)(7). 
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originally intended for liquidation en bloc.35 As a result, the non-defaulting party must 
perform on contracts that are unfavourable from its point of view or else pay damages 
(largely corresponding to the replacement cost) for non-performance, yet will receive 
only part of the damages provided for those broken contracts that are favourable to it. It is 
worth emphasising that these principles apply not only in the context of reorganisation 
proceedings but also in the event of liquidation, evidence that the idea of saving a 
business is paramount in US bankruptcy law or, in other words, of its pronounced debtor-
friendliness. 
By contrast, other jurisdictions are less debtor-friendly and more creditor-friendly, 
regardless of whether they belong to the common law or the civil law tradition. Most 
prominently, England is much more creditor-friendly, and the general legal position in 
respect of liquidation of contracts upon insolvency was traditionally such that the later 
implementation of the EU Financial Collateral Directive did not require fundamental 
changes to the regime in place. In England, termination and set-off upon insolvency have 
always been possible, also in a non-financial context.36 Under German law, the treatment 
of non-financial scenarios is much closer to the English position than to that of the US, 
with far-reaching termination and set-off rights also for non-financial counterparties.37 
                                                 
35 11 USC § 365(a).  
36 Agreements to terminate a limited interest conferred on another, or providing for automatic termination of that interest, 
if that other becomes insolvent do not contravene the anti-deprivation rule, Goode, ‘Perpetual Trustee’ (n 34) 8. The underlying 
idea is that insolvency law does not override freedom of contract where no question of a sham transaction has arisen (Lord 
Neuberger MR in Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1160, [2010] Ch 
347 at [91]. Cf n 37). As regards set-off, in England insolvency set-off kicks in upon commencement of the proceedings, which 
applies to all mutual credits, debts, or other mutual dealings between the insolvent and its counterparty (Insolvency Rules 1986 
(as amended), rule 2.85 (for administration) and rule 4.90). It is mandatory, retroactive and self-executing (MS Fashions Ltd v 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No. 2) [1993] per Hoffman LJ at 432-433; Stein v Blake [1996] 1 A.C. 243 per 
Lord Hoffmann at 253). However, it does not cover executory contracts but only obligations. Still, as termination remains 
possible, parties can always agree on automatic termination should one of them become insolvent, which would turn their 
executory contracts into simple payment obligations to which mandatory insolvency set-off would then apply, Goode, Principles 
of Corporate Insolvency Law (4th edn,  Sweet & Maxwell, London 2011) para 9-43. See also Peck, Mokal and Janger, ‘Financial 
Engineering’ (n 11), 4-6. 
37 Termination clauses are only void to the extent that they refer to the commencement of proceedings as the relevant 
trigger (Insolvenzordnung § 119), but are valid as a matter of contractual freedom if they refer to an event prior to 
commencement, such as default or filing of the bankruptcy petition, since the insolvency official has to accept the estate as is 
(BGH ZIP 1994, 40, 42; BGHZ 96, 34, 37-38. Further, there is a mandatory insolvency set-off rule for forward contracts, 
Insolvenzordnung §§ 94-96. If claims become due or congeneric only in the course of the proceedings, set-off must wait until 
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Belgium has introduced legislation that affords identical treatment in insolvency to 
financial and non-financial counterparties, which leaves only situations involving natural 
persons not acting in a merchant capacity to the general regime. The law expressly 
provides for close-out netting agreements to be enforceable.38 Lastly, the Italian legal 
regime generally allows for close-out netting provisions for financial and non-financial 
market participants, although it makes an exception for large corporations.39  
 
B. Swift Access to Collateral 
The second element of safe harbours relates to the timely enforceability of collateral 
in insolvency, ie, to the question of whether a secured counterparty may have immediate 
recourse to the collateral assets. In respect of financial counterparties, the various laws 
typically provide that, upon insolvency, financial counterparties can immediately enforce 
collateral provided by the insolvent, without prior authorisation, the obligation to conduct 
a public auction or similar requirements.40  
In the US, again, this contrasts with the general approach taken in respect of non-
financial counterparties. Outside the safe harbours, enforcement of security or collateral 
requires prior application to the court called upon to grant relief in case of otherwise 
inadequate protection of the secured creditor or if the asset is not essential to effective 
reorganisation.41 
                                                                                                                                           
then. If obligations are in different currencies or units, conversion is possible to make them congeneric).  The continued 
availability of set-off combines with the validity of pre-commencement termination: termination values can be set off even if 
proceedings have commenced in the meantime. 
38 Article 14 Loi relative aux sûretés financières. 
39 Within special reorganisation proceedings for large companies, the right to terminate and set-off is not recognized. 
However, the insolvency officials of the relevant proceeding would probably not be allowed to cherry-pick outstanding 
transactions under the master agreement that are favourable to the defaulting party and reject those that are disadvantageous for 
the latter. Instead, the insolvency official’s choice to continue the master agreement applies to the entire bundle of covered 
transactions. 
40 11 USC § 362(b)(6)-(7)-(17)-(27) and (o); Article 4(4) and (5) Financial Collateral Directive; see UNIDROIT Principle 
7(1)(a). 
41 11 USC § 362(a) and (d). 
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This clearly contrasts with English law, where the general policy is very different 
from that in the US. In winding-up proceedings, creditors are largely unaffected by the 
liquidation process as they can remove their security from the pool and realize it.42 In 
administration (remotely comparable to US reorganisation), the approach is obviously 
different and closer to the US model, as the secured creditor is dependent on leave from 
the court to enforce its security; this will usually be granted if significant loss to the 
secured creditor is likely to result from a refusal.43 Only substantially greater losses 
caused to others by such leave may outweigh the interest of the secured creditor.44 This is 
where the implementation of the Financial Collateral Directive has a significant impact, 
as it explicitly abolishes the requirement of court approval for transactions that come 
within its scope.45 
Under German law, the general position46 is that pledged movables are generally 
realized by the insolvency official for a secured creditor entitled to direct the manner in 
which the asset is realized and to whom immediate payment is made from the proceeds. 
The asset can also be transferred to the creditor if that is the most suitable solution. The 
insolvency official does, however, have the right to use the asset for the estate, in which 
case compensation has to be paid to the secured creditor for any deterioration of the asset 
affecting the security. In this respect, the German regime is comparable to the US model. 
The privilege afforded to financial counterparties consists in the fact that pledged 
financial collateral is exempt from this regime and can be realized by the counterparty 
unaffected by the commencement of proceedings.47 The Belgian Financial Collateral law 
                                                 
42 Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (n 36), Sweet & Maxwell, London 2011, para 8-47. Collateral can be 
used in the ordinary course of business without an application to the court; cash collateral may only be used with consent of 
creditor or the court. Only if the liquidator refuses to release the security asset must the creditor obtain leave of the court, which 
will almost invariably be granted since what is involved is not the property of the insolvent. Goode, ibid, referring to James LJ in 
Re David Lloyd & Co (1877) 6 Ch. D. 339 at 344-345. 
43 Insolvency Act 1986 Schedule B1 para. 43(2). But note the ability of the administrator to use cash collateral in case of a 
floating charge without consent of the creditor or court, ibid, para 70. 
44 Nicholls LJ in Re Atlantic Computer Systems Plc [1992] Ch. 505 at 543. 
45 Financial Collateral Arrangements (No. 2) Regulation 2003, reg. 8.  
46 Insolvenzordnung §§ 166, 169, 170, 172. 
47 Insolvenzordnung §§ 166(3), 173(1). 
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provides – for all market participants except natural persons – that the enforcement rights 
of those creditors benefiting from collateral are not suspended as long as the agreement 
creating the collateral was executed before the date of the bankruptcy order. The 
beneficiary of a share pledge has the right to appropriate the shares upon default of the 
pledgor. No prior notice or authorisation is required if appropriation is expressly 
permitted in the pledge agreement.48 In Italy, the impact of safe harbour legislation on 
the swift enforcement of collateral is considerable, as the insolvency regime outside the 
safe harbours resembles rather the US then the UK approach. Court authorisation 
confirming the existence of the claim is needed to enforce collateral, and the court can 
give directions as to how the security asset has to be realised and order it to remain part of 
the estate, against reimbursement of the creditor.49 By contrast, in respect of financial 
collateral, the collateral taker is entitled to immediately enforce the financial collateral by 
sale or appropriation, with respect to financial instruments, or by set-off, with respect to 
cash.50  
C. Protection against Avoidance 
The third element relates to avoidance. The relevant laws typically provide that in the 
insolvency of a financial institution, the insolvency official is generally unable to avoid 
prior legal acts on the ground that they constituted preferential treatment of a creditor or 
were undervalue transactions.51 Again, the gap between general insolvency law and the 
privileged safe harbour regime may vary depending on the jurisdiction. However, as to 
avoidance, the picture differs from the findings of the foregoing sections. Here, the 
privilege afforded to financial institutions is of similar significance throughout, as robust 
                                                 
48 Article 8 Loi relative aux sûretés financières. Although no prior court approval is required, the law provides for the 
possibility for the courts to exercise some form of control afterwards, see Article 8(3)s. 
49 Articles 53, 107 Bankruptcy Act (Italy).  
50 Art. 4(1) of Legislative Decree 170/2004 (enacting the Financial Collateral Directive in Italy). 
51 See 11 USC § 546(g), (j); Article 8(1)-(3) Financial Collateral Directive. European jurisdictions are to a large extent 
free to set the parameters for avoidance as the Directive leaves this issue largely to the law of the Member States, exempting only 
a number of standard situations of constructive preferential treatment from avoidance. See also UNIDROIT Principles on Close-
out Netting (n 1) Principle 7(1)(c)-(d). However, regularly, fraudulent transactions are not protected, see 11 USC § 546(e); 
Recital 16 Financial Collateral Directive; UNIDROIT Principles on Close-out Netting, Principle 7(2). 
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avoidance rules for non-financial market participants exist in the US as well as in 
England, Germany, Belgium and Italy.  
In the US, the general position is that creditors who have received payment or a 
security interest within 90 days prior to the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings 
are, as a rule, required to return it, except if the transfer was for value or undertaken in the 
ordinary course of business.52 In English administration or liquidation proceedings 
avoidance is possible in case of undervalue transactions except the debtor was in good 
faith, and in case of preferential treatment of a creditor provided that the debtor intended 
to prefer a creditor. Undervalue transactions or preferences can be avoided if they 
occurred within a two-years time frame prior to insolvency in case of a beneficiary that is 
connected with the debtor company, or within 6-month time frame in case of an 
unconnected beneficiary.53 Under German law, transactions can be avoided for preference 
within a three-month period prior to commencement of proceedings if the creditor knew 
about the insolvency of the debtor or if it could not have been unaware of it.54 Undervalue 
transactions can be avoided without any further ado if they occurred during the last month 
before the commencement of insolvency proceedings, or if they occurred during the 
second or third month before insolvency if the debtor was insolvent at that point in time, 
or if the creditor knew that other creditors would be prejudiced or if that fact was obvious 
to it.55 Belgian law contains a number of discretionary and automatic claw-back rules that 
apply during a six-month period prior to the commencement of proceedings, whereas 
avoidance of fraudulent transfers is not subject to a time limit.56 Under Italian law, 
transactions at undervalue are invalid if entered into during the two years prior to 
                                                 
52 11 USC § 547. 
53 Insolvency Act 1986, ss 238, 239, 240. 
54 Insolvenzordnung § 130. Variation margins provided under financial collateral arrangements are expressly exempt. 
Interestingly, the rule expressly states that the exemption takes effect only to the extent that the additional margin reflects the 
changes in value of the secured obligation. This requirement seems to have been inserted to avoid the problem of systematic 
under-collateralisation, see text to n 98-109. 
55 Insolvenzordnung § 131. 
56 Bankrupty Act (Belgium) of 8 August 1997, Articles 12, 17, 18 and 20.  
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commencement of proceedings. Furthermore, payments falling due on the day of the 
commencement of proceedings or thereafter are equally void if made during that two-year 
period. Fraudulent transactions can be voided if entered into during a suspect period of 
six months or one year, depending on the type of transaction.57 
  
3. Exponentiated Liquidity 
The strong polarity of the insolvency treatment of the financial sector, on the one hand, 
and of the non-financial sector, on the other hand, such as currently exists under US law, 
seems to be the exception rather than the rule. In other jurisdictions, the gap between the 
safe harbour regime and the general insolvency rules is much smaller and in some cases, 
the treatment of financial and non-financial scenarios is even identical or quasi-identical, 
at least as regards termination, set-off and swift access to collateral. The only exception is 
the regime for avoidance. Here, safe harbour rules afford considerable relief to the 
financial industry, not only in the US but also in other jurisdictions. The more obvious 
consequence of the above finding is that the perception of egregious privileges afforded 
to financial institutions can only be upheld in a domestic tunnel vision.58 Moreover, and 
more importantly, the above findings tie in seamlessly with the distorted view on the 
rationale for safe harbours. Liquidity as a main argument is not appropriate in a rather 
debtor-friendly environment such as the US Bankruptcy Code, which is why greater 
prominence is given, at least on the surface, to the systemic risk argument. In more 
creditor-friendly jurisdictions, which put greater emphasis on assets flowing back into the 
                                                 
57 Art 64-67 Bankrupty Act (Italy).  
58 See Morrison, Roe and Sontchi, ‘Rolling back the Safe Harbors’ (n 16) 12: ‘But if the safe harbours increase social 
welfare because they increase liquidity overall (and not just the benefited creditors at the expense of other creditors), then the 
safe harbours should apply to all secured debt, not just financial contracts.’ 
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economy quickly, there is obviously more room for a rationale based on liquidity and 
market efficiency.59 
Unlike the case of traditional security interests, the liquidity rationale of safe 
harbours has never received the degree of prominence in the policy debate it would have 
deserved.60 This is surprising, also because it may be safely assumed, in the light of 
lessons learned from the latest financial crisis, that in lobbying for safe harbours, the 
financial industry was probably focused more on business development than on risk 
limitation.61 
On the face of it, safe harbours produce economic effects quite similar to those 
associated with the protection of traditional security interests in insolvency.62 Because 
parties need not worry about their counterparty’s solvency, derivatives and repo contracts 
become more easily available, and at a reduced cost. As a result, the basic economic 
effect of safe harbours is considerable growth in volumes of the relevant types of 
transaction,  as could be observed in the run-up to the financial crisis, when repo markets 
doubled within 5 years63, and more efficient allocation of assets.  
In considering whether to introduce insolvency privileges, legislators must take into 
account the fact that such privileges almost automatically entail a shift of the risk from 
one segment of the market to another, the latter being potentially ‘weaker’ creditors. In 
this regard, too, there are no fundamental differences between traditional security 
interests and safe harbours. Therefore, the basic assumptions about liquidity and the 
resulting discussion about the overall social value of insolvency privileges are very 
                                                 
59 ISDA, Memorandum on the Template for Netting Legislation (March 2006).   
<http://www2.isda.org/search?headerSearch=1&keyword=model+netting> accessed 10 March 2015.  
60 See Bliss and Kaufman, ‘Derivatives and Systemic Risk’ (n 16) 66. See Recitals 12 and 19 Financial Collateral Directive. 
See also ISDA, Memorandum (n 59) where the word ‘risk’ appears eight times, whereas ‘liquidity’ is not mentioned at all; ABI, 
Reform of Chapter 11, (n 14) Section IV.E on ‘Financial contracts, derivatives and safe harbour protection’ mentions liquidity as 
a policy argument only once, and in the context of a side issue, whereas ‘stability’ is referred to eleven times. 
61 See Bliss and Kaufman, ibid 56. 
62 See Finch, ‘Security, Insolvency and Risk’ (n 21) 637-643. 
63See Bank for International Settlements, Quarterly Review, December 2008 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0812e.pdf> accessed 10 March 2015. 
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similar to those prevailing in the case of traditional security interests64 and will not be 
addressed here. Rather, I will concentrate on four novel effects of safe harbour rules that 
represent a quantum step in terms of increasing liquidity, in particular if taken in 
combination with one another. 
 
A. Flexibility across Legal Categories and Asset Types 
The risk mitigation techniques of master agreements (as protected by the safe harbour 
rules) are used to abolish established legal boundaries. In particular, differences between 
full title and security interest disappear, and boundaries between claims, cash and 
securities become blurred. This high degree of flexibility is nothing less than 
revolutionary, overthrowing traditional legal restrictions on the use of assets with a view 
to obtaining cash and creating liquidity more generally. The EU Financial Collateral 
Directive contains a paradigmatic blueprint for this phenomenon.65  
First, the differences between full title and security interests disappear because the 
safe harbours sanction the use of title transfer collateral, netting and ‘margining’.66 Under 
such arrangements, while the collateral provider is protected as efficiently as it would be 
under a traditional security interest such as a pledge or mortgage, the collateral taker 
enjoys far greater freedom to use the collateral assets than it would under a traditional 
security interest, in that it becomes the legal and beneficial owner of the asset and can 
therefore dispose of it, without being obliged to return that specific asset as long as the 
asset returned is of the same kind. What is remarkable here is that the rights of one party 
appear to grow whereas the risk borne by the other party remains unchanged. 
                                                 
64 See, eg, Finch, 'Security, Insolvency and Risk' (n 21); LA Bebchuk and J Fried, ‘The Uneasy Case for the Priority of 
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy’ (1996) 105 Yale Law Journal 857-934. 
65 See Articles 3-8 Financial Collateral Directive. 
66 ‘Margining’ is necessary because both the obligation and the value of the collateral asset typically change over time. 
Therefore, collateral levels are adjusted to the exposure on a daily basis. The obligation to post collateral might reverse in the 
course of the term of the contract; see, eg, Article 8(3) Financial Collateral Directive.  
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Furthermore, the boundaries between claims, money and securities become blurred 
as the collateral provider can validly substitute new collateral assets for the assets 
originally provided, which it might need for other purposes.67 The only proviso is that the 
replacement assets must be of substantially equivalent value. As a consequence, the 
collateral provider is allowed to replace one kind of securities collateral for another, or 
give cash for securities collateral, or claims for cash collateral, etc.  
On that basis, the specificity of the collateral assets becomes as irrelevant as their 
nature (money, claims or securities). Positions become interchangeable and the collateral 
provider will collateralize all available assets as efficiently as possible, thereby creating 
maximum return. The fact that assets are freed from the conceptual burdens associated 
with legal limits to traditional security interests means that they can be treated as mere 
accounting positions, the only parameter being current market value. Thus, thanks to the 
existence of safe harbours, a portfolio resembles a gigantic current account into which 
assets and liabilities, including collateral of whatever description, accruing under 
whichever type of arrangement, can be booked at current market value, so as to show the 
net exposure as a grand total.  
 
B. Stretching the Collateral Cover Thinly 
A phenomenon closely connected to the foregoing is the fact that safe harbour rules 
enable collateral to be allocated so efficiently that there will hardly be any collateral 
buffers around. The first aspect here is the effect of the enforceability of close-out netting 
on collateral levels. If a risk reduction of 80% can be taken for granted,68 parties would, 
                                                 
67 ‘Substitution’ describes the right to withdraw financial collateral on providing, financial collateral of substantially the 
same value, see, eg, Article 8(3)(b) Financial Collateral Directive. 
68 The notional amount (face value) of all types of OTC contract stood at approximately USD 693 trillion at the end of June 
2013. The gross market value of these contracts, ie, the cost of replacing all of them by equivalent contracts at the market price, 
was approximately USD 20 trillion. This amount corresponds to the gross market risk inherent in these contracts, ie, market 
participants were, on an aggregate basis, exposed to each other by that sum. At the same time, market participants’ aggregate 
actual credit exposures, ie, the remaining credit risk taking into account legally enforceable master agreements amounted to 
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of course, only collateralize the remaining 20%. Hence, much less collateral will be 
needed from the outset or, to put it differently, the same amount of collateral will suffice 
to cover a higher volume of transactions.  
At the same time, master agreements make it possible constantly to adjust collateral 
levels to the underlying exposures so as to avoid over or under-collateralisation. These 
margining mechanisms rely on the safe-harbour limitation of avoidance powers as they 
might otherwise be classified as late provision of collateral.  
Lastly, safe harbours enable the re-use of collateral assets by the collateral taker, 
given that the latter generally becomes their legal and beneficial owner. Therefore, as 
opposed to what is common in other markets (which are bound to traditional secured 
transactions, lack of safe harbour protection), the collateral taker will generally put the 
collateral assets to use instead of just ‘holding’ them, thereby maintaining the assets in 
constant flow.  
The result of the foregoing is that asset allocation is extremely efficient throughout 
the market. However, by the same token, it may also mean that the cover becomes 
extremely thin, as there are no longer any pools of unused assets. 
 
C. Sourcing Collateral Globally 
Collateral assets are scarce and sourcing them from a wider market would therefore be 
beneficial in terms of liquidity. However, before the broad introduction of safe harbour 
rules, financial institutions had to rely on domestic secured financing law. The diversity 
of mandatory insolvency and property law nurtured substantial doubts as to the cross-
jurisdictional enforceability of closeout netting and collateral.69 Cross-border collateral 
                                                                                                                                           
USD 3.9 trillion, which represents a risk reduction of about 80 %. See Bank for International Settlements, ‘OTC Derivatives 
Statistics at End-June 2013’ (November 2013) 2 <http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1311.pdf> accessed on 4 January 2014. 
69 See, regarding enforceability of collateral: P Paech, ‘Market Needs as Paradigm – Breaking up the Thinking on EU 
Securities Law’, in PH Conac, L Thévenoz and U Segna (eds), Intermediated Securities, (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 
22-64; in relation to enforceability of close-out netting: ‘Close-out Netting’ (n 6). 
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was possible but complicated to arrange, and each arrangement was only compatible 
within the two jurisdictions involved. The most prominent move to address this issue was 
the introduction of the Financial Collateral Directive, which created a harmonized safe 
harbour regime across the EU and led to the de facto abolition of traditional asset-based 
security interests amongst financial institutions. However, the phenomenon is not 
confined to the EU, as safe harbour rules are relatively homogeneous throughout all 
jurisdictions that have developed financial markets,70 even if the safe harbours of the 
Financial Collateral Directive are particularly broad.  
As a consequence, there is a harmonized legal space in which financial institutions 
can source and use collateral quasi-globally. The fact that there is now a level legal 
environment is illustrated by the circumstance that transactions can be documented in 
different markets under the same master agreements. In particular, the ISDA Master 
Agreement has gained global significance71 because its functionalities (termination, 
liquidation, set-off, collateral) are now recognized in the relevant jurisdictions. At the 
same time, the restriction of avoidance powers removes fears of re-characterisation, claw-
back and similar court actions. Despite the fact that many legal differences remain as to 
detail, it is probably fair to say that the market for collateral, and therefore the market for 
derivatives and repos, comes close to having a globally harmonized legal framework. The 
extensive introduction of safe harbour rules is actually a significant example of market-
driven high-impact international legal harmonisation,72 somehow silently overcoming 
statutory legal hurdles from which parties traditionally could not derogate. Mandatory 
insolvency and property law typically constituted the most significant threats to the 
enforceability of contracts. However, at statutory level, despite considerable efforts, 
States have to date been unable to agree on a legal framework that is compatible across 
                                                 
70 See above, 2nd Part. 
71 See Briggs J in Lomas & ors v JFB Firth Rixson, Inc & ors [2010] EWHC 3372 (Ch) at [53].  
72 See Bliss and Kaufman, ‘Derivatives and Systemic Risk’ (n 16) 56. 
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borders.73 Harmonisation on the basis of the introduction safe harbours not only lessens 
the importance of domestic policy in matters of insolvency but also reduces the 
importance of legal considerations in risk management to a significant extent.  
 
D. Efficient Use of Regulatory Capital 
Lastly, banking regulation sanctions the liquidity thus increased by the safe harbours. 
Notably, it recognizes the net exposures used by financial institutions for risk 
management purposes also with a view to calculating capital requirements. Safe harbour 
rules are of fundamental importance in this context because the relevant regulatory rules 
require absolute certainty that close-out netting and collateral will be enforceable in the 
event of insolvency.74 If that is so, banks are allowed to calculate their regulatory capital 
on the basis of net, rather than gross, credit risk exposures. As mentioned earlier, the 
average risk reduction through netting is roughly 80%. In order to grasp the effect of this 
significant reduction, it may be helpful to recall that regulatory capital is not, as is often 
assumed, a requirement to hold certain cash reserves available. Rather, regulatory capital 
describes the ratio between risk exposure and the capital raised by issuing own shares. As 
a consequence of the recognition of net risk in a safe harbour environment, a bank is able 
to enter six times the gross risk in its balance sheet than it would otherwise be allowed to 
accept.75 
                                                 
73 The law governing the cross-jurisdictional transfer of property over securities, including the issue of securities collateral, 
is still entirely national and therefore probably the only piece of that globalisation puzzle that is still missing. The Geneva 
Securities Convention and the Hague Securities Convention both address this issue but have never been implemented. See 
UNIDROIT Convention on Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities of 9 October 2009 (‘Geneva Securities Convention’) 
<http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/capital-markets/geneva-convention> accessed on 15 March 2015; Convention on the Law 
applicable to certain Rights in respect of Securities held with an Intermediary of 5 July 2006 (‘Hague Securities Convention’) 
<http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=72> accessed on 15 March 2015. 
74 Bank for International Settlements/Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards (Comprehensive version)’ (June 2006 – ‘Basel II Accord’) paras 117, 118, 139, 188 
<www.bis.org/publ/ bcbs128.htm> accessed on 15 March 2015; ‘Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector’ (December 
2009) 43 <www.bis.org/publ/bcbs164.pdf?noframes=1> accessed on 15 March 2015. 
75 By way of a simplified example: a bank’s derivative and repo portfolio is taken into account at a gross risk of 1000 GBP 
because there are no safe harbours. This risk needs to be matched, at the current minimum rate of 10.5% regulatory capital, by 
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The effect is two-fold.76 First, availability and liquidity of repo transactions are 
improved because absolute regulatory limits accommodate a higher volume where 
calculation on a net basis is allowed. This effect is not necessarily confined to derivatives 
and repo transactions but extends across the balance sheet to any other risk-taking activity 
such as ordinary lending. If as a consequence of safe harbours less capital is needed to 
match derivatives and repo transactions, ordinary lending activity may likewise be 
increased. The second effect is a cost-saving element for banks, since share capital is a 
relatively expensive means of financing. If contracts of a higher aggregate volume can be 
entered on the basis of the relevant available share capital base, their relative cost 
decreases. 
 
4. A Systemic Risk Zero-Sum Game? 
As we have just seen, safe harbours considerably increase efficiency and liquidity but 
may lead to the collateral cover being stretched thinly. The connection with the second — 
more prominent — rationale for safe harbours is obvious: the question of how much 
collateral is available is of immediate importance for systemic stability: more efficiency 
increases the availability of collateral which is generally beneficial—but overstretching is 
harmful because there will be no reserves when collateral becomes scarce.  
Insolvency safe harbours have to date mainly been regarded as necessary to decrease 
the systemic risk inherent in the financial market, in particular to assist in avoiding the 
domino effect of bank insolvencies.77 To this end, derivatives and repo transactions need 
specific exemptions from the usual ‘threats’ that flow from the opening of insolvency 
                                                                                                                                           
105 GBP in own share capital. In other words, the amount of issued share capital limits the possibility to take on more risk. 
However, if netting is allowed the bank can, on the basis of the same 105 GBP in share capital, enter into contracts exposing it to 
a gross risk of 5000 GBP if we assume that close-out netting reduces the gross risk by 80%. 
76 See Paech, ‘The Need for an International Instrument’ (n 1) 16-19. 
77 See, in particular, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Report and Recommendations of the Cross-Border Bank 
Resolution Group’ (2010) 36-40 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs169.pdf> accessed 10 March 2015. For US legislative history see 
Mooney, ‘The Bankruptcy Code’s Safe Harbors’ (n 12) 247-251. 
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proceedings.78 First, the insolvency of one financial institution could provoke the failure 
of its counterparties which, alone or jointly, might in their turn bring down others, 
sparking off a chain reaction. Secondly, there is significant potential for transmission of 
liquidity problems between market participants. Thus, the limitation (or near-elimination) 
of individual counterparty credit risk is expected to have a beneficial effect on systemic 
stability. In other words, privileges afforded to counterparties of a failing institution 
would translate into systemic stability and therefore into advantages benefiting the market 
as a whole. This argument is particularly relevant to the financial sector, even more so 
than to other sectors, as financial institutions are so closely intertwined.79 Network 
externalities are therefore much more likely to occur than they are in other industries, and 
furthermore spread from the financial sector to invade entire economies.80 On the basis of 
this broad argument, safe harbour rules have been successively introduced in over 40 
jurisdictions.  
However, in light of the significant economic benefits that come with safe harbours, 
some authors regard them as the result of path-dependent legislation originally set off by 
banks’ own lobbying efforts.81 These, they argue, should now be considerably restricted 
or repealed altogether, since they actually created systemic risk rather than curbed it.82 
The reasons brought forward in relation to this argument are appealing, and the picture is 
certainly a complex one. Thus, while, on the one hand, credit risk contagion is effectively 
inhibited by close-out netting and collateral as protected by safe harbour rules, it is also 
true that, on the other hand, these mechanisms can at the same time develop adverse 
systemic effects through other transmission mechanisms.83 Broadly speaking, relevant 
                                                 
78 See UNIDROIT Principles on Close-out Netting (n 1) Principles 6 and 7. 
79 Edwards and Morrison, ‘Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code’ (n 16) 11. 
80 Bliss and Kaufman, ‘Derivatives and Systemic Risk’ (n 16) 66; Lubben, ‘Repeal the Safe Harbors’ (n 16) 329.  
81 Schwarcz and Sharon, ‘The Bankruptcy Law Safe-Harbor’ (n 16) 1737-1742. 
82 See, in particular, Lubben, ‘Repeal the Safe Harbors’ (n 16); Roe, ‘Derivatives Market Payment Priorities’ (n 16). 
83 Pistor, ‘A Legal Theory of Finance’ (n 22) sections 3.2 and 4.3 provides evidence that the antagonising effects of 
financial law, ie creating and threatening liquidity at the same time, are a general and logical characteristic of the market. 
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examples fall into two categories of risk transmission mechanism, to wit, moral hazard 
and collateral/liquidity shortages.  
While these two typical systemic risk transmitters can, in principle, antagonize the 
systemically beneficial effects of safe harbours, it would not make sense to analyse this 
interdependency in isolation. Regulation is much more relevant to the limitation of 
systemic risk and directly addresses the relevant contagion mechanisms through other — 
often novel — measures. This leads to the question of whether the strong influence 
insolvency law has on conduct makes it an appropriate means to control systemic risk and 
the behaviour of market participants while they are going concerns. In the following 
sections, I shall attempt to combine these aspects to form an overall picture.  
 
A. Moral Hazard  
Safe harbours create a transaction environment for financial institutions that is almost 
entirely free of counterparty risk. This places financial institutions in a privileged position 
as compared to other, non-financial counterparties (although, as discussed in the second 
part of this article, the degree of privilege differs from one jurisdiction to another84). 
Thanks to these privileges, risk is shifted to non-financial counterparties, which alone 
have to bear the specific cost of bankruptcy. In that respect, safe harbour rules have an 
effect quite comparable to that of traditional security interests. 
The existence of such a privilege is bound to affect the perception and conduct of 
market participants generally. As a result, the existence of safe harbours may provoke 
moral hazard.85 In the context of financial regulation, the term ‘moral hazard’ describes a 
mechanism whereby real or presumed guarantees for the financial sector render the 
financial market more risk-prone on an aggregate basis. The phenomenon has been 
identified as a major driver of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. For years, financial 
                                                 
84 See second Part.  
85 Roe, ‘Derivatives Market Payment Priorities’ (n 16) 545. See Baird, ‘Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms’ (n 21), 578, 
589-592. 
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institutions had enjoyed high income generated by excessive risk-taking in the 
expectation that the cost of failure would be socialized. After the crisis, a number of 
regulatory changes were introduced in an attempt to tame moral hazard, with a view to re-
allocating to financial institutions and their stakeholders the risk they themselves create.86  
Shifting the risk as such does not necessarily entail moral hazard. All kinds of 
insolvency privileges shift risk around the insolvent’s various types of creditors. The 
question, rather, is whether that shift entails a behavioural pattern that increases the risk 
overall, or, to put it differently, whether the level of systemic risk in the market as a 
whole increases. 
Such an overall rise in systemic risk could be caused in particular by market 
inefficiencies. Already in relation to traditional security interests, the possibility for 
bigger players to demand security indirectly subsidizes their businesses at the expense of 
certain other players, since the latter are unable to adjust to the increased risk.87 The effect 
of the risk transfer caused by insolvency safe harbours is similar: parties to whom risk is 
shifted are generally remote from the financial sector and as a result lack the ability to 
monitor the shift and adjust their own behaviour, in particular by demanding a higher risk 
premium or by not entering into the relevant position or quitting it altogether.88 The risk-
taming effect of corrective behaviour at that end of the market is lacking, and this in turn 
renders the distribution of risk inefficient and the market overall riskier. It is worth noting 
that this shift of risk is global, as in practice all eligible creditors will take the necessary 
steps to move ahead of the pool by using the safe harbours.89 The risk is shifted to those 
that have no means of improving their position in any insolvency proceedings: in 
particular depositors, unsecured bond-holders, share-holders and ‘ordinary’ creditors of 
                                                 
86 These measures include remuneration of bank managers, higher bank capital requirements, new bank resolution 
regimes, stricter regulation of derivatives, introduction of anti-cyclical capital and liquidity buffers, and others. See for an 
instructive overview < http://ec.europa.eu/finance/general-policy/policy/map_reform_en.htm#row7> accessed 10 March 2015.   
87 See Finch, ‘Security, Insolvency and Risk’(n 21) 639.  
88 Edwards and Morrison, ‘Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code’ (n 16) 32, 34; Roe, ‘Derivatives Market Payment 
Priorities’ (n 16) 570; Finch, ‘Security, Insolvency and Risk’ (n 21) 644-645 (in relation to traditional security interests). 
89 See Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law (n 17) 36. 
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the insolvent. It is true that non-adjusting market participants in the proper sense are few, 
traditionally they included retail depositors (which are now often protected by own 
preferences and/or deposit insurance) and ordinary creditors. However, mindful of the 
too-big-to-fail phenomenon, to which safe harbours contribute by allowing for 
exponential growth of the derivatives and repo markets, the State has traditionally 
assumed the risk as a whole, so that even adjusting creditors have no need to take the shift 
of risk into account.90 
Furthermore, security may distort managerial diligence in the choice of 
counterparties.91 As before, this argument can be translated into the context of insolvency 
safe harbours: financial counterparties rely exclusively on the risk-mitigation tools 
guaranteed under the safe-harbour regimes instead of investing into ex ante and on-going 
monitoring of their counterparties.92 Yet, such overreliance on safe harbours could also 
lead to moral hazard.93 By contrast, if, in the absence of safe harbours, monitoring were a 
necessity, any concentration of risk on certain players would be detected and priced in by 
potential counterparties; as a consequence, there would be more players with smaller risk 
portions in the market, and the market would be more diversified overall.94 Moreover, in 
times of crisis, with falling or unclear collateral value, the information obtained through 
monitoring would allow lending to continue as healthy counterparties could continue to 
operate even in adverse times.95  
However, it is moot whether a case of moral hazard can be built on the foregoing. It 
is not evident that the market becomes riskier overall, as compared to the hypothetical 
                                                 
90 See Roe, ‘Derivatives Market Payment Priorities’ (n 16) 558-559; Peck, Mokal and Janger, ‘Financial Engineering’ (n 
16), 12. It is debatable whether this holds true in all respects. The implicit State guarantee for banks might be regarded as the 
price paid for having energetic, growth-producing and stimulating financial markets. Although recent regulatory initiatives 
attempt to remove the State guarantee completely, it is not absolutely certain whether financial markets that go beyond pure 
utility banking can be governed in a way that makes bail-outs completely unnecessary in the future. See also more generally 
Pistor, ‘A Legal Theory of Finance’ (n 22) 323. 
91 See Finch, Security, Insolvency and Risk, 646. 
92 Roe, ‘Derivatives Market Payment Priorities’(n 16) 560-561. 
93 Roe, ibid. 
94 Roe, ibid. 
95 Roe, ibid 567-568.  
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alternative, a market without safe harbours. Hard evidence of such a connexion is difficult 
to establish and is often attempted with an eye to a preconceived result.96 To begin with, 
obviously, improved monitoring is always beneficial.97 Yet the value of monitoring 
highly complex, international and interconnected counterparties is limited. 
Comprehensive data regarding the counterparties is unlikely to be available. Even where 
such data is available, its value is limited as counterparties’ balance sheets are not static 
and are subject to network externalities, since the riskiness of assets depends on the 
market as a whole.98 Therefore, the available data says little about the riskiness of a 
balance sheet in times of stress. In other words, monitoring counterparties to prevent risk 
is generally useful but not as powerful a tool as reducing counterparty risk through 
security, collateral and close-out netting — for which the existence of safe harbours is 
essential. 
Speaking more generally, moral hazard, together with the too-big-to-fail argument, 
are amongst the main phenomena that have been identified as the origins of the recent 
financial crisis. They are not triggered by the existence of safe harbours alone but by an 
amalgam of causes and incentives and, probably, the fundamental socio-economic set-up 
of the financial market as a whole. Repealing or restricting safe harbour regimes is not, 
therefore, necessarily a suitable means of removing moral hazard, in particular because 
safe harbours are concerned above all with enforceability of contractual rights and only 
have an indirect influence on behaviour. Instead, measures explicitly designed to address 
moral hazard and too-big-to-fail are more focused and therefore more effective, such as 
bank resolution (discussed below), structural reforms cutting down the size and 
interconnectedness of banks, and reform of pay structures that dis-incentivize excessive 
                                                 
96 Baird, ‘Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms’ (n 21) 589.  
97 See, in particular, efforts to strengthen due diligence regarding counterparties instead of exclusive reliance on credit 
ratings: Financial Stability Board, ‘Principles for Reducing Reliance on Credit Ratings’ (27.10.2010) 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_101027.pdf?page_moved=1> accessed 10 March 2015.   
98 See, eg, AG Haldane and RM May, ‘Systemic Risk in Banking Ecosystems’ (2011) 469 Nature 351-355. 
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risk taking.99 These measures address moral hazard and too-big-to-fail directly, instead of 
using the threat of unenforceability, the consequences of which are difficult to contain, as 
a vehicle. They are currently being refined and implemented on a wide scale, but of 
course this does not per se exclude complementary adjustments to the safe harbour 
regime should they prove necessary. 
 
B. Collateral/Liquidity Shortages  
When a financial institution enters troubled waters, the safe harbour-protected liquidation 
rights of counterparties will be triggered at some point. The contractual arrangements 
with basically all counterparties are highly likely to be affected simultaneously.100 Such a 
scenario of mass liquidation can have adverse systemic effects that antagonize the 
beneficial systemic effects of safe harbours.101 The following two examples illustrate how 
safe harbour rules can limit and spread contagion at the same time — ‘which effect is 
more important is conceptually indeterminate’, thereby weakening the systemic risk 
rationale for insolvency safe harbours.102  
A first example103 of off-setting systemic benefits and drawback relates to a 
phenomenon that was a major transmission mechanism for systemic risk during the recent 
financial crisis. The failure of a major participant in the highly concentrated derivatives 
                                                 
99 See, eg, Financial Stability Board, Principles for Sound Compensation Practices (2.4.2009) 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_0904b.pdf> accessed 10 March 2015; Principles for an Effective 
Risk Appetite Framework, (18.11.2013) <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_131118.pdf> accessed 10 
March 2015; Progress and Next Steps towards Ending To-Big-To-Fail (2.9.2013) http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_130902.pdf> accessed 10 March 2015. Many, if not most, post-crisis legislative initiatives address moral 
hazard and too-big-to-fail in one way or the other. 
100 See, eg, Section 5(a)(vi) ISDA 2002 Master Agreement, the ‘cross-default’ provision following which a default event 
will occur if a party defaults on a third-party obligation and the default or the obligation is in excess of a specified threshold 
amount.  
101 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, (n 74) para 115; Financial Stability Board, ‘Key Attributes of Effective 
Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions’ (2014) paragraphs 4.3-4.4 and Annex IV  
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_141015.pdf> accessed 10 March 2015; see Bliss and Kaufman, 
‘Derivatives and Systemic Risk’ (n 16) 20; Duffie and Skeel, ‘Cost and Benefits of Automatic Stays’ (n 16) 10. 
102 Roe, ‘Derivatives Market Payment Priorities’ (n 16) 566-567. See Edwards and Morrison, ‘Derivatives and the 
Bankruptcy Code’ (n 16) 2. 
103 See Bliss and Kaufman, ‘Derivatives and Systemic Risk’ (n 16) 11, 18-19 and fig. 2; Edwards and Morrison, 
‘Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code’ (n 16) 10-11; Morrison, Roe and Sontchi, ‘Rolling Back the Repo Safe Harbors’ (n 16) 
14-16; Roe, ‘Derivatives Market Payment Priorities’ (n 16) 545-546. 
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market causes a liquidity and collateral shortage. Safe harbours, on the one hand, protect 
the market from these failures because the relevant counterparties can have recourse to 
close-out netting and seize collateral. Thus, the failure of a major player is unlikely 
immediately to cause further insolvencies through the domino effect. However, all the 
insolvent’s counterparties would need to replace all terminated contracts in order to re-
hedge their open positions, ie, a large number of new contracts would be created 
elsewhere in the market within a very short time frame. Fire-sale liquidation of collateral 
and the sale of further assets to be able to post cash collateral under the new contracts 
might considerably depress asset prices and might still push the entire market into a 
collateral crunch. 
A second example104 relates to the situation of financial institutions that are already 
ailing but not yet technically insolvent, or in relation to which no proceedings have as yet 
been opened. Does the protection of close-out netting and collateral arrangements 
exacerbate or improve their financial position? On the one hand, if parties are properly 
collateralized, close-out netting and collateral arrangements ensure that a market 
participant is able to continue trading, since as long as there is no actual failure (or other 
termination event), its counterparties will see no immediate need to pull out of the 
relationship.105 Thus close-out netting and collateral, at this stage, can help to prevent a 
further deterioration of the financial position of an ailing firm. On the other hand, it might 
be argued that as soon as the market becomes aware of financially deteriorating 
conditions, collateral arrangements will lead to calls for additional collateral, since the 
collateral taker will have initially made do with collateral the value of which was inferior 
to the actual exposure (which is common practice between financially healthy parties). 
This would force the ailing firm into a liquidation of assets in order to meet these 
demands and spark a depression in asset prices, as the valuation of assets is based on 
                                                 
104 See Bliss and Kaufman, ibid 10, 19. Roe, ibid 565-566; see also Edwards and Morrison, ibid 91, 94, 101 (citing the 
example of the failure of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998). 
105 See Morrison, Roe and Sontchi, ‘Rolling Back the Repo Safe Harbors’ (n 16) 9. 
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market price (‘mark-to-market’), thereby further aggravating the situation. The moment 
the firm failed to provide sufficient collateral to one of its many counterparties, thereby 
triggering close-out, cross-default clauses would ensure that virtually all contracts with 
other market participants were closed out at the same time, thus leaving the firm totally 
unhedged. Its financial position will prevent it from replacing these hedges at market 
price, a situation guaranteed to propel it over the brink of insolvency very quickly, 
rendering any further attempts at restoring viability useless. 
This example points to the important issue of insufficient levels of initial 
collateralisation (generally called ‘initial margin’). Safe harbour regimes allow for 
margining during the lifetime of a contract. The rationale for this exception is to prevent 
unenforceability of collateral provided prior to insolvency, including during a so-called 
suspect period where, from the point of view of the estate, there is no need for 
avoidance,106 notably because there is no preferential treatment of a creditor. If applied 
consistently, margining does not actually constitute preferential treatment. Other creditors 
are not disadvantaged because there is no net outflow of assets from the pool. However, 
safe harbour rules in many jurisdictions do not distinguish on the basis of the criterion of 
net outflow but restrict avoidance more generally.107 As a consequence, later delivery of 
collateral is not voidable even in cases in which there is a net outflow of assets. In 
practice, parties use this freedom in ‘good times’ to suspend the provision of initial 
margin for an indeterminate period, notably as long as the obligor is financially sound.108 
Yet this practice could be exactly regarded as a preference in that it does not merely 
reflect an increased obligation.109 It is also problematic in terms of systemic risk; no great 
                                                 
106 See Recital 16 Financial Collateral Directive.  
107 See, in particular, Recital 16 Financial Collateral Directive: ‘[…] The intention [of restricting avoidance] is merely that 
the provision of top-up or substitution financial collateral cannot be questioned on the sole basis that the relevant financial 
obligations existed before that financial collateral was provided, or that the financial collateral was provided during a prescribed 
period. […]’ (emphasis added). 
108 Roe, ‘Derivatives Market Payment Priorities’ (n 16) 563. 
109 Roe, ibid, 573; Mooney, ‘The Bankruptcy Code’s Safe Harbors’ (n 12), 257; Skeel and Jackson, ‘Transaction 
Consistency’ (n 16) 190-191. 
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flight of imagination is needed to see that not enough collateral would be available should 
calls for additional collateral occur on a wider scale across the market, which is exactly 
the mechanism that caused the AIG insolvency during the financial crisis. Any defaults 
on calls for additional collateral would trigger liquidation under the relevant master 
agreements. Thus, insufficient initial margin, to the extent made possible by the 
insolvency safe harbours, would therefore appear to be a significant crisis accelerator.110 
However, again, this problem could potentially be addressed from different angles. The 
insolvency safe harbours could either be narrowed so that calls for additional margin that 
went beyond a mere adjustment of values could be avoided, or regulation could impose 
proper collateralisation on the parties. After the crisis, the international community went 
for the second option by setting standards on initial margin while at the same time 
upholding the safe harbours in this respect.111 These standards pay particular attention to 
the equilibrium of systemic risk, on the one hand, and liquidity on the other hand, notably 
by imposing gradual requirements that are in addition phased in over a longer period. 
This measure is complimentary to other regulatory rules, such as transparency 
requirements regarding repo portfolios, restrictions on re-use of collateral securities, 
mandatory haircuts,112 liquidity buffers and requirements for central clearing and 
                                                 
110 See FSB, ‘Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reform’ (2010) para 3.6.2 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_101025.pdf> accessed 22 March 2015. 
111 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and Board of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions, 
‘Margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives’ (March 2015) <http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d317.htm> accessed 17 
March 2015; IOSCO Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, ‘Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures’ (April 
2012) Principle 6 <http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101a.pdf> accessed 17 March 20015; Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories 
(commonly called ‘EMIR’) Article 46(1).  
112 ‘Haircut’ is market vernacular for a risk control measure applied to underlying assets whereby the value of those 
underlying assets is calculated as their market value reduced by a certain percentage (the ‘haircut’). Haircuts are applied by a 
collateral taker in order to protect itself from losses resulting from declines in the market value of the collateral asset in the event 
that it needs to liquidate that collateral, see European Central Bank online glossary, 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/glossary/html/glossh.en.html> accessed 10 March 2015. ‘Mandatory haircut’ refers to a legal 
requirement to apply such abatement for risk management purposes, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and Board of 
the International Organisation of Securities Commissions, ‘Margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives’ (March 
2015) <http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d317.htm> accessed 17 March 2015. 
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reporting of derivatives.113 All these measures are conceived directly to address the 
systemic risk flowing from the use of repos and securities lending transactions and 
derivatives, amongst other purposes. It would not be possible to achieve similarly well-
calibrated solutions to that problem by abolishing or restricting safe harbour regimes — 
such an approach would be too bold and the resulting legal uncertainty would paralyse 
the market, as nobody would be able to rely on the enforceability of contractual risk 
mitigation. 
 
C. Bank Resolution and Systemic Relevance114 
As discussed before, one of the rationales of safe harbours is the need to prevent the 
systemic consequences of the failure of financial institutions. Obviously, not every failure 
need trigger systemic risk: for instance, the breakdown of a local savings bank will leave 
the wider financial world and economy largely unaffected. Typically, the systemic 
importance of financial institutions grows with increasing size, irreplaceability and 
interconnectedness.115 Therefore, safe harbours have the most effect where they protect 
large, interconnected institutions from the insolvency of their peers. However, it now 
appears that this understanding should be fundamentally revised, as the largest financial 
institutions will, in future, no longer enter into insolvency proceedings but instead will 
face ‘resolution’. Supervisory authorities will now in practice use this new, special 
administrative procedure to stave off consequences of the kind experienced in the wake of 
the Lehman failure, deploying various tools such as transferring viable business to a state-
                                                 
113 See, in particular, European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
reporting and transparency of securities financing transactions (29.01.2014) COM(2014) 40 final 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2014/EN/1-2014-40-EN-F1-1.Pdf> accessed 9 April 2015; FSB, Strengthening 
Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking, (29.8.2013) <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_130829a.pdf>; Regulatory Framework for Haircuts on non-centrally cleared securities Financing Transactions 
(14.10.2014) http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_141013a.pdf as well as the measures listed in n 111. 
114 I am grateful to Johannes Rehahn, research assistant at the LSE Law Department, for his valuable assistance on this 
section. 
115 International Monetary Fund/Bank for International Settlements/Financial Stability Board, Guidance to Assess the 
Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial Considerations (2009) paras 12-15 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/othp07.pdf> accessed 10 March 2015. 
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owned bridge bank or another healthy bank, or converting debt owed by the failing bank 
into shares in the bank (‘bail-in’). Resolution regimes are now being introduced 
globally116 and apply to banks, investment firms,117 and, increasingly, financial market 
infrastructures,118 the three most important categories of financial institution in systemic 
terms. Insolvency of systemically important financial institutions will therefore be a well-
nigh redundant concept. No insolvency officials or courts will be involved and no cherry 
picking or avoidance for preference will be available. Insolvency safe harbours will 
therefore remain relevant only to the counterparties of failing financial institutions other 
than banks, investment firms and financial market infrastructures. 
Even where master agreements provide for termination and close-out upon 
reorganisation or restructuring,119 resolution regimes eschew the route of privileged 
treatment through a safe harbour-like mechanism. Instead, they espouse the idea of a stay 
or moratorium with automatic effect or one which may, and probably as a rule will be 
imposed on the counterparties of the institution under resolution by regulators.120 This 
breathing space was introduced to allow the competent authority to evaluate the financial 
contracts of an ailing institution and to decide which should be transferred to a healthy 
                                                 
116 The US introduced this mechanism in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act in 1991 to address negative externalities 
potentially caused by the exercise of termination rights. The FDIA was originally applicable to institutions with a banking 
licence. After the Financial Crisis, the US modelled a broader rule on the FDIA that was included in the Dodd-Frank Act, 
sections 201(a)(11), 203, now also covering bank holding companies and, under certain conditions, non-banks. England and 
Germany adopted similar rules in 2009 and 2010. Also in 2010, the mechanism was elevated to global best practice by the FSB 
and several jurisdictions have since followed suit. In 2011, the FSB published twelve main features of effective resolution 
regimes which were updated in October 2014; see Financial Stability Board, Key Attributes (n 101). The EU introduced a 
common rule in 2014, implemented in the course of 2015; see Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and 
amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC [etc] of the European Parliament and of the Council [2014] OJ L173/190 (‘Bank 
Resolution Directive’). 
117 See article 1(1)(a) Bank Resolution Directive; sections 201(a)(7), (8), (11), 203(b) Dodd-Frank Act. 
118 Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures/International Organization of Securities Commissions, ‘Recovery 
of Financial Market Infrastructures’ (2014) para 2.2.3 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD455.pdf> accessed 
10 March 2015; Financial Stability Board, ‘Key Attributes’ (n 101) para 1.2. In the EU, the Consultation on a framework for the 
recovery and resolution of financial institutions other than banks was closed on 28 December 2012. No further steps have been 
taken so far. Under US law, large parts of the financial market infrastructure are already covered; see sections 201(a)(8), (11), 
(14), 102(a)(4)(C) Dodd-Frank Act. 
119 See, for example, sections 10(a)(vi), (b)-(g), 2(a)(v) of the 2011 Global Master Repurchase Agreement; section 
5(a)(vii) ISDA 2002 Master Agreement: ‘a general assignment, arrangement or composition with or for the benefit of its 
creditors’ is assigned to be an Event of Default and Termination Event. 
120 Articles 69-71 Bank Resolution Directive; section 210(c)(10)(B) Dodd-Frank Act. 
 36 
institution and which should remain in the ailing estate and be wound up. The idea is also 
to avoid important changes on the balance sheet caused by extensive exercise of 
termination rights.121 Resolution regimes are more clear-cut in this regard than insolvency 
laws. There are no exceptions from the administrative stay comparable to safe harbour 
rules in insolvency law.122 Indeed, the stay typically ends after two days and termination 
rights do not re-emerge in relation to those parts of the business saved by the regulator, in 
particular by transferring them to a financially healthy institution such as another bank. 
Termination rights are only revived in respect of those contracts which remain in the now 
isolated ‘toxic’ part of the estate which is destined to be liquidated by recourse to 
ordinary liquidation proceedings.123 But this rump estate would typically not be of 
systemic importance. 
However, if systemic risk is increasingly brought under control by regulatory 
changes, ‘what then remains of the original rationale for the safe harbours’?124 As a 
consequence of the introduction of resolution regimes, counterparties of an ailing 
financial institution will fall into one of the following three categories. First, they will 
include those market participants that are not covered by safe harbour rules; these will 
generally belong to the non-financial world and will not be of systemic importance to the 
financial sector. Secondly, they will encompass those financial market participants 
generally covered to the extent that they deal with banks, investment firms and financial 
market infrastructures, which will in practice never become insolvent but enter resolution 
proceedings as they fail. Thirdly, they will include those financial market participants that 
are generally covered to the extent that they contract with a counterparty that enters 
insolvency proceedings as it fails, which means any financial institution other than banks, 
                                                 
121 Recital (94) Bank Resolution Directive. 
122 However, title transfer financial collateral arrangements and set-off and netting arrangements are to be protected 
against split-up in the event of a transfer; see article 77 Bank Resolution Directive. 
123 Articles 71(1)-(5), 118 Bank Resolution Directive. The suspension does not, however, apply where the counterparty is 
a central bank, a central counterparty or a settlement system, ibid (3); section 210(c)(8)(A) and (10)(B) Dodd-Frank Act. 
124 Morrison, Roe and Sontchi, ‘Rolling Back the Repo Safe Harbors’(n 16) 3. 
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investment firms and financial market infrastructures or one of the aforementioned where 
the regulator decides not to invoke resolution but to allow the market participant to fail as 
it is of no systemic importance.  
As a result, the safe harbour rules will remain without effect in the most systemically 
relevant failures, notably those of systemically relevant banks, investment firms and 
infrastructures. Instead, regulators will use a completely different set of legal mechanisms 
to avoid contagion, including a stay on termination of contracts. Where insolvency 
proceedings may still occur, notably upon failure of a systemically irrelevant financial 
institution, the systemic risk rationale of safe harbours does not bite: the failure of such an 
institution is unlikely to contribute significantly to systemic risk, either through knock-on 
effects on counterparties or by leading to a liquidity crunch.125 Thus, it is probably fair to 
state that the introduction of bank resolution regimes has considerably reduced the scope 
of application of safe harbours mainly to systemically irrelevant scenarios. This does not, 
however, remove the importance of safe harbours for all types of financial institution 
which occur before resolution or insolvency proceedings are opened, as described earlier.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Insolvency safe harbours are conceived on the basis of a double rationale. On the one 
hand, safe harbours allow for exponentially increased market liquidity based on the 
highly efficient use of assets for purposes of collateralisation. Literally any type of asset, 
regardless of its legal nature, can now be turned into cash using repo or derivatives 
transactions. Differences between cash, claims and securities become irrelevant and the 
importance of the legal nature of rights in these assets (traditionally full title, security 
interest or claim) likewise vanishes. As a consequence, the concept of ‘asset’ assimilates 
with the concept of ‘liquidity’ as all positions held by a financial institution with its 
                                                 
125 Bliss and Kaufman, ‘Derivatives and Systemic Risk’ (n 16) 17. 
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counterparty form part of the same gigantic current account—the grand total of which, 
the ‘net amount’, corresponds to the risk exposure. The amount of liquidity created 
through safe harbours, which mirrors the degree to which risk is shifted, depends on the 
scope of safe harbours (Which types of transaction? Which types of financial institution?) 
as chosen by the relevant legislator. 
On the other hand, insolvency safe harbours limit — or even well-nigh eliminate — 
individual counterparty credit risk for the sake of increased overall systemic stability. 
However, the systemic risk aspect of the rationale is much more complex than is 
commonly understood and goes far beyond the idea that domino-like contagion is 
avoided from the outset because the counterparties of the insolvent party will not fail as a 
consequence of the safe harbour protection. Rather, that — valid — argument is both 
supported and countered by other mechanisms that either limit (eg, avoidance of runs on 
ailing firms) or increase (eg, moral hazard) the systemic risk. Which of these effects will 
prevail depends on the concrete circumstances and is difficult to predict. The systemic 
risk rationale is further weakened by the appearance of bank resolution regimes. These 
new administrative procedures render safe harbours largely irrelevant as tools to mitigate 
systemic risk. 
Furthermore, the liquidity and the risk rationale are closely intertwined. The highly 
efficient use of homogenized assets on a cross-border, globalized basis makes collateral 
more readily available and at lower cost, but at the same time spreads the collateral cover 
very thinly across the market: it is large and flexible but can break easily if something 
goes wrong. So again, what is beneficial generally (collateral more easily available) may 
turn out to be dangerous in times of stress (no asset reserves).  
The above leaves the legislator with a picture in which the containment of 
counterparty risk through safe harbours is clear, but where it is not so obvious whether 
the limitation of systemic risk is a good enough policy argument. This dilemma reflects 
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the fact that in the financial market, risk can be dispersed but will not effectively 
disappear until obligations are settled. Yet legislators, in their normative decisions, opt for 
liquidity and strong growth of the financial market — an argument well-known in the 
world of traditional security interests, which generally privileges major market players for 
the sake of a more liquid lending market. To the extent that safe harbours are based on a 
systemic risk rationale, this is at odds with reality – the main argument, at least today, is 
liquidity. This incongruence explains why the debate on safe harbours is so relevant to the 
US but much less so in other jurisdictions. Where insolvency law is more creditor-
friendly from the outset, liquidity of assets is a more attractive argument than it is in 
debtor-focused insolvency regimes.  
Still, repealing or fundamentally revising the concept of safe harbours with a view to 
avoiding adverse systemic effects is not only unnecessary but also rather counter-
productive.126 First, systemic risk is based on an amalgam of many different causes and 
incentives and changing the safe harbour regime would only address one isolated aspect, 
whereas the overall repercussions for risk management flowing from changes to the safe 
harbour regime are potentially negative. Secondly, insolvency law, though it has 
significant influence on the behaviour of market participants towards risk-taking while 
they are going concerns is too bold a tool to control that behaviour. This role is better left 
to regulation. Regulation is able to address more selectively the vast majority of adverse 
systemic effects in which safe harbours may have a (smaller or larger) share, notably by 
establishing requirements for liquidity buffers, mandatory haircuts, initial margin 
requirements, central clearing and in respect of risk-taking behaviour, without choking 
the liquidity made possible by the safe harbours. 
Furthermore, there is no equally effective risk mitigation tool to hand at the moment, 
especially not from a global point of view. Only safe harbours allow for cross-
                                                 
126 The recent report of the American Bankruptcy Institute on a possible reform of Chapter 11 (n 14) has stopped short of 
recommending a fundamental overhaul of the safe harbour concept. See, in particular, ibid. 102 in relation to the risk-
accelerating effect of safe harbours. 
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jurisdictional use of assets on the present scale, an effect that is achieved through 
homogenous insolvency regimes in this respect. This globalisation of asset use could 
never be achieved on the basis of traditional security, if only for reasons of lack of legal 
certainty. 
In the future, safe harbours will continue to spread to other jurisdictions. Insolvency 
safe harbours have a logical attraction for every aspiring financial market. The fact that 
safe harbours are an integral part of the capital requirements regime and the considerably 
increased liquidity that comes with safe harbours would make it virtually impossible for a 
jurisdiction to participate in the global financial market if they did not have a safe harbour 
regime. Contracting with market players from markets that lack safe-harbour protection is 
expensive and much riskier. Therefore, markets and regulators will need to continue 
implementing safe harbours, many using the Financial Collateral Directive or the 
UNIDROIT Principles on Close-out Netting as blueprints. As long as fundamental ideas 
about the size of the financial market and the acceptance of the risk naturally flowing 
from it are not re-thought, there is no viable alternative to insolvency safe harbours. 
